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Between 1783, when the United States won independence from Great Britain, until the
passage of the National Currency Act in 1863, the largest component of U.S. currency in circu-
lation was notes issued by state-chartered banks. These banknotes were dollar-denominated
promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand and were distinguishable by issuing bank.1
Virtually all banks that existed during this period issued banknotes. Since the country had
approximately 325 banks in 1820, close to 850 banks in 1840, and more than 1,500 in 1860,
large numbers of distinct currencies were in circulation in the country throughout the ante-
bellum period.
Banknotes circulated in the location of the issuing bank, and the notes of at least some
banks also circulated outside the local area. In the vernacular of the day, such banknotes
were known as “foreign notes.” We know this from several sources. The balance sheets for
virtually every bank during this period have an asset account for notes of other banks, and
the balance sheets for banks in several states have separate account listings for out-of-state
notes. An 1842 report of banks in Pennsylvania lists the banks’ holdings of notes of other
banks by bank. It shows that Pennsylvania banks held the notes of banks in at least 61 cities
and in 15 other states. The clearing system for New England banknotes run by Suﬀolk Bank
in Boston cleared a large volume of notes. Such a system would not have been necessary if
the circulation of banknotes had been entirely local. Finally, banknotes bearing the stamp of
a business in another location are still in existence.
Due to the concurrent circulation of a large number of notes of diﬀerent banks, spe-
1During this period, a dollar was defined as a governmentally minted coin containing 371.25 grains of
silver. Large denomination coins were made of gold. The gold content of the dollar was changed in 1834 and
1837. Banknotes were almost always at least $1 in denomination, and in many cases banks were restricted to
issue notes no smaller than $5. Notes of these denominations are roughly comparable to $20 and $100 bills
today.
cialized publications, generically called banknote reporters, came into existence. They were
usually published by a note broker or in conjunction with one. They were published at least
monthly (or more frequently in some cases), and each issue listed virtually all of the banks
in existence in the country at the time and quoted the discount at which the notes of each
bank would be exchanged for notes of local banks (banks in the city where the reporter was
published). In other words, banknote reporters listed the exchange rates of the notes of each
bank in the country in terms of local banknotes. Banknote reporters are known to have been
published in many cities, including New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Pittsburgh, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Chicago, and Zanesville (OH).2
If we examine the discounts quoted in banknote reporters, five facts emerge:
1. Local banknotes were always quoted at par.
2. “Foreign” banknotes usually were quoted at a discount to local banknotes, and this
discount varied by the location of the bank and the reporter.
3. Discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in
location A on the notes of banks in location B generally diﬀered from the discounts
quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A.
4. Discounts on foreign notes were higher when those notes were not being redeemed at
par.
5. Local banknotes were quoted at a discount to specie when local banks suspended pay-
ment on their notes.
The purpose of this paper is to build a model that can qualitatively match these facts
2Newspapers in many cities also published banknote lists, which contained the same information as in a
banknote reporter and were based on information provided by a note broker.
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about banknote discounts. The model we construct builds on the basic search model of
money by Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). To attempt to account for the locational
diﬀerences in banknote discounts, our model has agents that come from two distinct locations,
whereas the Trejos-Wright framework implicitly assumes that all agents are in one location.
In addition, unlike the model of Trejos-Wright, our model does not have fiat money but
instead has banknotes issued by banks in the two locations. We find that an equilibrium
exists in which these banknotes are valued and act as media of exchange.
We model the fact that banknotes had to be redeemed in specie on demand by adapting
the Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999) innovation that banks are required to produce when a
banknote is presented for redemption and their past actions are public information. We
present two versions of the model. In the first, banks are threatened with permanent autarky
if they ever fail to produce the same quantity of goods when their notes are presented for
payment as they obtain when issuing a note. We refer to this case as par redemption. In
the second, banks are allowed to suspend payments on their notes by redeeming them below
their issue value. This second version of the model is intended to capture a feature of the
actual experience of the period under consideration.
By requiring that banks must redeem their notes, we capture the aspect of banknotes
that made them like debt instruments as modeled by Gorton (1999). However, Gorton is
interested in determining whether prices of banknotes reflected banks’ risk-taking behavior in
the pre—Civil War period, where a risky bank is one that is likely to overissue banknotes. The
mechanism that allows market participants to adequately price these risks is the redemption
option: banknotes can be sent for redemption to the issuing bank, and if this is not too costly,
then the issuing bank can be discouraged from overissuing by the threat of bank runs. In
3
Gorton’s model, the main determinant of the costs related to sending notes for redemption
is the physical distance between the location at which trade occurs and the location of the
bank that issued the banknotes used to trade. In our model, banknote prices are instead
exclusively related to trading opportunities and the value of each one of these opportunities.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we document the five facts about
banknote discounts that we want to match. In Section 2, we present the model environment.
In Section 3 we define a monetary symmetric steady-state equilibrium for this economy. In
Section 4, we show that for certain values of the parameters, we can explain facts 1 through
3 for the case in which bankers are required to redeem their notes at par. In Section 5, we
examine the case in which banks have suspended payment on their notes and show that for
certain values of the parameters, we can explain facts 4 and 5. The final section concludes.
1. Facts about banknote discounts
In this section we present some documentation for the five facts about banknote dis-
counts that we want our model to be consistent with. The first fact is that banknotes went at
par in the local area. An examination of the banknote reporters for New York, Philadelphia,
Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Pittsburgh shows that notes of local banks that had not failed
were always listed at par.
The same examination reveals the second fact: notes of nonlocal banks (i.e., “foreign”
banknotes) generally were listed at a discount that varied by the location of the bank and
the banknote reporter. For example, Thompson’s banknote reporter published in New York
on April 1, 1852, lists notes of New England banks at a 1
4
percent discount, those of South
Carolina banks at a 11
4
percent discount, those of Ohio banks at a 11
2
percent discount, and
4
Figure 1: Discounts on notes of New York and Philadelphia banks, 1845—56
those of Tennessee banks at a 3 percent discount. For the same date, Van Court’s banknote
reporter published in Philadelphia lists these discounts as 3
8
percent, 1 percent, 11
2
percent,
and 21
2
percent, respectively.
The third fact is that the discounts on banknotes were asymmetric: the discount
quoted in location A on notes of banks from location B was not generally the same as the
discount quoted in location B on notes of banks from location A. This is shown in Figure
1, where we plot the discounts on New York banknotes as quoted in Philadelphia and the
discounts on Philadelphia banknotes as quoted in New York for the period 1845—56. The
figure shows that with the exception of a short period in 1847, the notes of New York banks
were quoted at a lower discount in Philadelphia than the notes of Philadelphia banks were
quoted in New York. Further support for the asymmetry of discounts is given in Figure 2,
5
Figure 2: Discounts on notes of Cincinnati and Philadelphia banks, 1845—56
where we plot the discounts on the notes of Cincinnati banks as quoted in Philadelphia for the
period 1845—56. The notes of Philadelphia banks were always quoted at a lower discount–in
most cases, at no discount at all–in Cincinnati, whereas the notes of Cincinnati banks were
always quoted at a discount in Philadelphia. We obtain a similar result when we replace
Philadelphia with New York for this comparison.
The final two facts we want to explain with our model concern the behavior of banknote
discounts when banks suspend, that is, when banks are not redeeming their notes at par on
demand. The first of these final two facts is that the discounts on foreign banknotes were
higher when banks had suspended payments. Figures 3 and 4 show the behavior of the
discounts on notes of banks in Wilmington, NC, and Philadelphia as quoted in New York
for the period 1835—60. The figures show that banknote discounts were generally larger
6
Figure 3: Discounts on notes of Wilmington, NC, banks as quoted in New York, 1835—60
Figure 4: Discounts on notes of Philadelphia banks as quoted in New York, 1835—60
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Figure 5: Discounts on Philadelphia banknotes in terms of gold in Philadelphia, 1835—60
for Wilmington, NC, banks and always larger for Philadelphia banks when these banks were
suspended than when they were not. The behavior in these figures is consistent with that of
the discounts on the notes of banks in other locations and quotes from Philadelphia instead
of New York.
We did find one exception, however. When New York banks suspended in May 1837,
the discount on their notes in Philadelphia fell rather than rose. This exception is the only
one that we have been able to find.
The final facts that we want to match with the model is that banknotes went at a dis-
count against specie locally when banks suspended. This is shown for the case of Philadelphia
banknotes in Figure 5.
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2. Model environment
The model environment is similar to that of Shi (1995) and Trejos-Wright (1995). Time
is discrete and infinite. There is a single, nondurable good that is perfectly divisible. There are
two types of agents, nonbankers and bankers. Both types of agents can produce and consume
the nondurable good. Bankers also have access to a technology to produce banknotes–
pieces of paper that bear the name of the banker. Banknotes are indivisible. We assume
that nonbankers are anonymous and their past trading histories are private information. In
contrast, bankers are not anonymous, and their past histories are public information. All
nonbankers are identical, and all bankers are identical.
There are two locations–home and foreign. There is a measure BH of bankers in the
home location (home bankers) and a measure BF of bankers in the foreign location (foreign
bankers). In addition, there is a measure H of nonbankers from the home location (home
nonbankers) and a measure F of nonbankers from the foreign location (foreign nonbankers).
At the beginning of each period, a nonbanker has a probability π of being a consumer
but not a producer, the same probability of being a producer but not a consumer, and a
probability 1 − 2π of being neither. Also at the beginning of the period, a banker has an
equal probability of being either a consumer or a producer, but cannot be both. Whether
a banker is a producer or a consumer in a period is public information before any trading
occurs.
In every period, nonbankers from location j have a probability 0 < θj < 1, where the
subscript denotes the location of the nonbanker j ∈ {H,F}, of meeting pairwise with a banker
in their location. However, they cannot meet bankers in the other location. The restriction
that nonbankers do not meet bankers in their location with certainty is intended to capture
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the fact that it was costly for nonbankers to go to local banks to obtain banknotes (by taking
out loans or paying specie) or to redeem banknotes. The restriction that nonbankers cannot
meet bankers from the other location is intended to capture the fact that it was more costly
for nonbankers to go to nonlocal bankers than to local ones. We assume that θHH ≤ BH and
θFF ≤ BF , so that a nonbanker that has the opportunity to be matched with a banker can
be. Bankers cannot trade with other bankers.
Nonbankers who do not meet a banker meet randomly pairwise with another nonbanker
with probability δ. Given our randommatching assumption, the probability that a nonbanker
meets a home nonbanker is
PH = δ
(1− θH)HF
(1− θH)HF + (1− θF )
,
and the probability that a nonbanker meets a foreign nonbanker is
PF = δ
(1− θF )
(1− θH)HF + (1− θF )
.
The within-period meeting possibilities for nonbankers are illustrated in Figure 6.
That nonbankers cannot be producers and consumers at the same time introduces a
problem of lack of double coincidence of wants into meetings between nonbankers. The lack
of double coincidence of wants and the anonymity of nonbankers give rise to the need for
a medium of exchange. This role is filled by banknotes. We assume that nonbankers can
hold the notes of either home or foreign bankers subject to a unit upper-bound restriction
on banknote holdings. We assume that nonbankers can trade banknotes for the nondurable
good, but cannot trade notes of banks in one location for notes of banks in the other location.
In pairwise meetings between nonbankers in which one has a banknote and the other does
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Figure 6: Within-period meeting possibilities for private agents
not, we assume that the note holder makes a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) oﬀer to the other.
We further assume that nonbanker producers always trade if indiﬀerent.
We now consider the maximization problems of bankers and nonbankers
A. Bankers
Bankers can produce and consume the nondurable good. In addition, they have the
technology to costlessly issue banknotes, which are pieces of paper distinguishable by the
issuer. Banknotes are indivisible. In meetings with nonbankers, bankers either produce a note
for qj ∈ R+ units of the nondurable good or redeem a previously issued note forQj ∈ R+ units
of the nondurable good, where the subscript denotes the location of the banker j ∈ {H,F}.
Thus, qj is the issue value of a banknote, and Qj is the redemption value of a banknote.
Note that bankers do not redeem notes of bankers in the other location. This assumption
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is consistent with the fact that during the period we are considering, a bank would not give
specie for the notes of another bank unless that bank had previously established an account
for the purpose with it.
The momentary utility function of a banker is assumed to be
u(qj, Qj) = u(qj)−Qj, j ∈ {H,F}.
The function u has the properties u(0) = 0, u0 > 0, u0(0) = ∞, u0(∞) = 0, and u00 < 0.
Bankers are assumed to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility, where β is the discount
factor. The choice variable for bankers is qj. We assume that Qj is determined exogenously.
When a nonbanker producer meets a banker, we assume that the banker makes a TIOLI
oﬀer to the producer. Given Qj, the banker will oﬀer the nonbanker producer a banknote in
exchange for the largest quantity of the good such that the producer is indiﬀerent between
producing and receiving a banknote and not producing.
We assume that the redemption price is determined exogenously, because during the
period we are considering, the laws governing banking required that banks redeem their notes
at par. Failure to do so would mean that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a bank
could face penalties and ultimately lose its banking privileges. We interpret par redemption
as Qj = qj; that is, banks must redeem their notes at the issue value. The fact that bankers
are not anonymous and that their histories are public information in our model means that
bankers could potentially be punished for failing to redeem their notes at this exogenously
determined price. Hence, it will not be utility maximizing for a bank to deviate.
The extraordinary circumstances when banks could suspend payment were generally
understood to be times when banks in the whole country or large sections of the country
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suspended specie payments on notes due to exceptionally large drains on their specie reserves.
Because of the widespread nature of these suspensions and fears of the consequences if banks
were required to redeem notes at par, state banking authorities usually did not take actions
against banks during these suspensions, although in many cases, states passed laws requiring
banks to resume payments by a certain date or lose their banking privileges. To account for
the fact that suspensions of specie payments on notes did occur, we also consider the case
in which bankers have suspended payments on notes, which we interpret as Qj < qj. We
continue to have Qj exogenous in the suspension case.
Let Zj be the expected discounted lifetime utility of a j banker. Bankers are willing
to issue and redeem banknotes as long as Zj ≥ 0.
B. Nonbankers
We assume that nonbankers in both locations have a momentary utility function of
the form
u(c)− y,
where c denotes consumption and y denotes production. Nonbankers are assumed to maximize
expected discounted lifetime utility, where β is the discount factor.
Let Vk andWk, k ∈ {0, H, F} denote the beginning-of-period expected value of having
no banknotes (k = 0), holding a home banknote (k = H), and holding a foreign banknote
(k = F ) for a home nonbanker and a foreign nonbanker, respectively. Further, let xj ∈ R+
and zj ∈ R+, j ∈ {H,F} denote the production of a home nonbanker and a foreign banker,
respectively, in a meeting with the holder of a home note (j = H) or a foreign note (j =
F ). Since we consider only steady-state equilibria, the value functions and the production
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quantities are independent over time. We say that foreign banknotes go at a discount in the
local market if nonbankers with foreign notes obtain fewer goods from local producers than
nonbankers with local notes. The discount on foreign notes in the home market is
dH = 1−
xF
xH
.
If we apply the same concept in the foreign market, the discount on home banknotes in the
foreign market is
dF = 1−
zH
zF
.
If either discount is negative, then nonlocal notes are said to be going at a premium.
Let 0 ≤ mji ≤ 1 be the fraction of nonbankers from location j holding an i banknote
and 0 ≤ λikj ≤ 1 be the probability that a k (consumer) with an i banknote trades with a j
(producer). Further, define Ωki to be the expected value for a k consumer with an i banknote
of going to the private market. Specifically,
ΩHi = maxλiHH ,λiHF π{PHmH0λ
i
HHΛ
0
H [u (xi)−∆Hi]
+PFmF0λ
i
HFΛ
0
F [u (zi)−∆Hi]}, i ∈ {H,F}
(1)
ΩFi = maxλiFH ,λiFF π{PHmH0λ
i
FHΛ
0
H [u (xi)−∆Fi]
+PFmF0λ
i
FFΛ
0
F [u (zi)−∆Fi]}, i ∈ {H,F},
(2)
where Λ0jk denotes the probability that nonbankers from location j without a banknote trade
with a nonbanker with a k note, ∆Hi = β(Vi−V0), and ∆Fi = β(Wi−W0). The first term on
the right-hand side of (1) is the expected value of meeting another home nonbanker without a
banknote, and the second term is the expected value of meeting a foreign nonbanker without
a banknote. The sum of these terms is multiplied by the probability that the other nonbanker
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in the meeting is a producer to obtain the expected value to a home consumer of going to
the private market with an i banknote. The terms in (2) are similarly interpreted.
Let 0 ≤ γj ≤ 1 be the probability that a nonbanker from location j trades with a
banker. Then the flow Bellman equations for home nonbankers with a banknote are
(1− β)VH = π{θH max
γH∈[0,1]
γH [u(QH)−∆HH ] + (1− θH)ΩHH}(3)
(1− β)VF = (1− θH)πΩHF(4)
and those for foreign nonbankers with a banknote are
(1− β)WF = π{θF max
γF∈[0,1]
γF [u(QF )−∆FF ] + (1− θF )ΩFF}(5)
(1− β)WH = (1− θF )πΩFH(6)
The incentive compatibility conditions are
γH ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(QH)−∆HH > 0
{φ} if u(QH)−∆HH = 0
{0} if u(QH)−∆HH < 0
γF ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(QF )−∆FF > 0
{φ} if u(QF )−∆FF = 0
{0} if u(QF )−∆FF < 0
(7)
λiHH ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(xi) > xi
{φ} if u(xi) = xi
{0} if u(xi) < xi
λiFH ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(xi) > zi
{φ} if u(xi) = zi
{0} if u(xi) < zi
(8)
λiHF ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(zi) > xi
{φ} if u(zi) = xi
{0} if u(zi) < xi
λiFF ∈
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{1} if u(zi) > zi
{φ} if u(zi) = zi
{0} if u(zi) < zi
15
where φ = [0, 1].
The Bellman equations for nonbankers without a banknote are obtained in a similar
manner. Define Ωk0 to be the expected value for a k producer with no banknote of going to
the private market. Specifically,
ΩH0 = max
λ0H ,λ
0
F
π[(PHmHHΛHHH + PFmFHΛ
H
FH)λ
0
H(∆HH − xH)(9)
+(PHmHFΛFHH + PFmFFΛ
F
FH)λ
0
F (∆HF − xF )]
ΩF0 = max
λ0H ,λ
0
F
π[(PHmHHΛHHF + PFmFHΛ
H
FF )λ
0
H(∆FH − zH)(10)
+(PHmHFΛFHF + PFmFFΛ
F
FF )λ
0
F (∆FF − zF )],
where λ0j and Λ
i
kj are defined analogously to Λ
0
j and λ
i
kj above. The first term on the right-
hand side of (9) is the expected value of meeting a nonbanker with a home banknote, and
the second term is the expected value of meeting a nonbanker with a foreign banknote. The
sum of these terms is multiplied by the probability that the other nonbanker in the meeting
is a consumer to obtain the expected value to a home producer of going to the private market
with an i banknote. The terms in (10) are similarly interpreted. With this notation, the
Bellman equations for nonbankers without a banknote are
(1− β)V0 = π{θH max[∆HH − qH , 0] + (1− θH)ΩH0}(11)
(1− β)W0 = π{θF max[∆FF − qF , 0] + (1− θF )ΩF0}(12)
Bankers and nonbankers with banknotes are assumed to make TIOLI oﬀers to non-
bankers who are producers without banknotes. These oﬀers extract all of the surplus from
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the trade. Note that the agent making the oﬀer takes Vj and Wj as given. These oﬀers will
be
qH = β(VH − V0)(13)
qF = β(WF −W0)(14)
xj = β(Vj − V0), j ∈ {H,F}(15)
zj = β(Wj −W0), j ∈ {H,F}(16)
Substituting (13)—(16) into (11) and (12) yields V0 =W0 = 0.
C. Steady-state banknote holdings
Because we are focusing only on steady-state equilibria, we also require that the dis-
tribution of banknote holdings remain the same from period to period. Listing the outflows
from a given banknote holding on the left-hand side and the inflow on the right-hand side, the
conditions on the distribution of banknote holdings that have to be satisfied for a steady-state
equilibrium are as follows.
For nonbankers without a banknote:
mi0
"
θi + (1− θi)πPj
X
k=H,F
mjkΛkji
#
(17)
= mii[Γiθi + (1− θi)πPjmj0Λiij ] +mij(1− θi)πPjmj0Λiij, i, j ∈ {H,F}, i 6= j
For nonbankers with a banknote of a bank in their location:
mii[Γiθi + (1− θi)πPjmj0Λiij] = mi0[θi + (1− θi)πPjmjiΛiji], i, j ∈ {H,F}, i 6= j(18)
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For nonbankers with a banknote of a bank in the other location:
mijmj0Λ
j
ij = mi0mjiΛ
j
ji, i, j ∈ {H,F}, i 6= j(19)
3. Equilibrium
We are now ready to define a symmetric steady-state equilibrium for this economy.
Definition: Symmetric steady-state equilibrium (SSE)
Given QH and QF , an SSE is a set
Φ = {qi, xi, zi, Vi,Wi, Zi,mji, γi,Γi, λijk,Λijk,∀i, j, k ∈ {H,F}}
that satisfies maximization with TIOLI oﬀers, the steady-state banknote holding equa-
tions, λijk = Λ
i
jk, γi = Γi, Vi ≥ 0,Wi ≥ 0, Zi ≥ 0,∀i, j, k ∈ {H,F}.
Definition: Nonmonetary SSE
A nonmonetary SSE is the set
ΦN = {φ ∈ Φ : Λijk = Γi = Vi =Wi = Zi = 0,∀i, j, k ∈ {H,F}}.
That is, in a nonmonetary equilibrium there is no trade and banknotes are not valued.
Proposition 1. A nonmonetary SSE exists for this economy.
Proof: Substitution of φ ∈ ΦN into (3)—(8) and (11)—(16) shows that all conditions
of an SSE are satisfied and qH = qF = xH = xF = zH = zF = 0. ¥
Definition: Monetary SSE
A monetary SSE is a set
ΦM = {φ ∈ Φ : Γi,Λiii, Zi > 0 for i ∈ {H,F} and VH ,WF > 0}.
18
This definition of a monetary SSE is strong in that it requires that both types of banknotes are
valued (VH ,WF > 0) and circulate (Bi,Γi > 0). We adopt this definition because banknote
discounts were quoted in terms of notes of local banknotes, which implies that more than
one type of banknote was in circulation. Note, however, that our definition of a monetary
SSE does not require interlocation circulation of banknotes. A question that we explore
below is, for what parameter values do there exist equilibria in which there is interlocation
banknote circulation, that is, monetary equilibria in which either Λiij > 0 or Λ
i
ji > 0 for some
i, j ∈ {H,F}, i 6= j.
Lemma 1. In a monetary SSE with Γi = 1, mi0 = mii, i ∈ {H,F}.
This result is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. In a monetary SSE, ΓH(xH − qH) = ΓF (zF − qF ) = 0; that is, banknotes circulate
locally at par (at their issue value).
This result follows from the assumption that bankers and nonbankers with notes get to make
TIOLI oﬀers to nonbankers without notes.
4. Par redemption equilibria
The first type of monetary SSE we examine is one in which the issue, redemption, and
circulation values of banknotes are the same.
Definition: Par redemption SSE
A par redemption SSE is a set
ΦP = {φ ∈ ΦM : Qi − qi = 0, i ∈ {H,F}}.
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We can prove existence of a par redemption SSE for small values of θH and θF . In
this case, notes of both home and foreign bankers trade in all single coincidence meetings.
Theorem 1. Suppose u(·) is homogeneous of degree n, with n ∈ (0, 1), n = mk , where m and
k are natural numbers. Then for small values of θH and θF , a unique monetary SSE with
Λijk = Γi = 1,∀i, j, k exists.
Proof. In the appendix.
A. Numerical analysis
For larger values of θH and θF , we present the equilibria for a numerical examples in
which we assume that u(c) = cα, α = 1
2
, ρ = 0.01, π = 0.5, and δ = 0.9.3 Initially, we set
H/F = 1, so that there is the same measure of nonbankers in both locations. The properties
of the par redemption SSE for this numerical example are shown in Figure 7. Region 1 is the
region to which the theorem applies. Both home and foreign consumers play pure strategies
and exchange both home and foreign banknotes with nonlocal producers with probability 1
(Λijk = 1,∀i, j, k). (Recall that in a monetary equilibrium consumers always trade local notes
with local producers by definition.) In regions 2 and 3, one type of nonbanker continues
to play a pure strategy while the other plays a mixed strategy in meetings with nonlocal
producers when holding a local banknote. Specifically, in region 2, foreign consumers play a
pure strategy and trade both types of notes with both types of producers with probability 1
(ΛiFj = 1,∀i, j). However, home consumers holding a home note now play a mixed strategy
in meetings with foreign producers (ΛHHF ∈ (0, 1)), although they trade foreign notes with
3We have also computed the SSE for various α ∈ (0, 1). The qualitative results are the same as those
presented below.
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Figure 7: Par redemption SSSE
foreign producers with probability 1 (ΛFHF = 1). In region 3, the behavior of the two types
of consumers is reversed. In regions 4 and 5, both consumers again play pure strategies.
However, now consumers from one location–home consumers in the case of region 4 and
foreign consumers in the case of region 5–do not trade local notes with producers from the
other location. That is, ΛHHF = 0 in region 4 and Λ
F
FH = 0 in region 5. Consumers from
the other location continue to trade both types of notes with both types of producers with
probability 1. Finally, in region 6, consumers play pure strategies, but trade only local notes
and only with producers from their own location. That is, in region 6, the two locations are
distinct; there is no interlocation trade.
Because we are interested in the discounts on banknotes, the case of interest to us
is region 1 where banknotes trade in all meetings between nonbankers from both locations.
Thus, from this point, we will restrict our attention to the region in which θH and θF are small.
21
Figure 8: Eﬀects of changes in θH on quantities of purchased goods
Because the probability of nonbanker—banker meetings is low in this case, focusing on this
case is equivalent to making Cavalcanti and Wallace’s (1999) assumption that the measure
of bankers in the economy is small. Because we are unable to obtain analytic comparative
statics results, we continue with the numerical analysis.
The eﬀects of changes in θH on the quantities of the good that can be purchased with
banknotes in the two locations are shown in Figure 8. The quantity of goods that can be
obtained with a home banknote from both home producers (xH) and foreign producers (zH)
increases with θH , and the quantity of goods that can be obtained with a foreign banknote
from both home producers (xF ) and foreign producers (zF ) decreases with θH . Because of
the symmetry of the model, increases in θF would have the opposite eﬀects.
To see the intuition behind these results, consider the case of a home nonbanker holding
a home banknote. The larger θH , the higher the probability of meeting a home banker and
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being able to redeem the note at par with certainty, as opposed to going to the private market
where the nonbanker can exchange a banknote for goods only in matches with a nonbanker
who happens to be a producer without a banknote. Thus, the larger θH , the higher the
expected value of home banknotes to a home nonbanker. Hence, xH is larger, the larger θH .
Further, the higher xH increases the expected payoﬀs to foreign holders of home banknotes,
so that zH increases as well.
The intuition for the response of the quantities of goods that are obtained in exchange
for foreign notes to changes in θH is similar. The larger θH , the higher the probability that
a home nonbanker holding a foreign note will not be able to trade because home nonbankers
now have a higher probability of meeting a home banker who will refuse to redeem the note
and a lower probability of meeting another nonbanker who might potentially trade. Thus,
foreign banknotes become less valuable to home nonbankers, so that xF is lower. In turn, the
lower xF reduces the payoﬀ to foreign nonbankers of holding a foreign banknote, although
the eﬀect is partially oﬀset by the fact that a larger θH means that foreign nonbankers have
a higher probability of meeting foreign producers.
The eﬀects of changes in θH on banknote discounts are shown in Figure 9. The
discount on foreign notes in the home market (dH) increases with θH . This occurs because
xH is increasing in θH , whereas xF is decreasing as shown in figure 8. (Foreign notes are
actually trading at a premium for low θH because the figure is drawn for θF = 0.1, and this
diﬀerence between θH and θF makes foreign notes more valuable in the home market.) The
discount on home notes in the foreign market (dF ) is decreasing in θH , however. This occurs
because zH is increasing in θH , whereas zF is decreasing. Because of symmetry, the opposite
eﬀects occur with increasing θF . Note that because discounts depend on θH , the figure shows
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Figure 9: Eﬀects of changes in θH on banknote discounts
that the predictions of the model are consistent with the fact that actual banknote discounts
depended on the location of the quote.
The figure also shows that the model’s predictions are consistent with another fact
about actual banknote discounts: these discounts were generally asymmetric, meaning that
the discount on foreign notes in the home market diﬀered from the discounts on home notes
in the foreign market. The figure shows that discounts on foreign notes in the home market
can be either larger or smaller than discounts on home notes in the foreign market and that
the diﬀerence dH − dF increases with θH . In our example, discounts are equal only when
θH = θF .
Next we determine the eﬀects on dH and dF of changes in the relative measures of
home and foreign nonbankers. Specifically, in Figure 10, we show the eﬀects of increasing
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Figure 10: Eﬀects of increasing H/F
H/F . The figure shows that as H/F increases, discounts on foreign notes in the home
market increase and discounts on home notes in the foreign market increase. Increasing H/F
increases the probability that the holder of a banknote will meet a producer from the home
location rather than a producer from the foreign location in the private market. Because a
home producer is willing to exchange more goods for a home banknote than for a foreign
banknote, this increases the value of the home banknote relative to a foreign banknote. The
discount on foreign banknotes in the home market increases. And because a foreign producer
is willing to produce more goods for a foreign banknote than for a home banknote, the lower
probability of meeting such a producer reduces the value of foreign banknotes relative to
home banknotes. Because discounts in the model depend on H/F , we interpret the results
in the figure as showing that the model’s predictions are consistent with the fact that actual
banknote discounts depended on the location of the bank.
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5. Suspension equilibria
We now turn to the case in which bankers in at least one location have suspended note
redemption in the sense that the redemption value of their notes is less than the issue value.
We discuss the predictions of the model and whether these predictions are consistent with
the data.
Definition: Suspension SSE
A suspension SSE is a set
ΦS = {φ ∈ ΦM : Qi − qi < 0, for some i ∈ {H,F}}.
We present results for the same numerical example as for the case of par redemption
SSE. We model suspension by assuming that Qi = (1 − ki)qi, ki ∈ [0, k¯i], i ∈ {H,F}, where
k¯i is that value such that u[(1− k¯i)qi] = qi. That is, k¯i is the smallest redemption value of a
banknote as a percentage of issue value that is consistent with the existence of a monetary
SSE.
We first consider the case in which kH = 0, kF > 0, that is, the case in which home
bankers redeem their notes at par, but foreign bankers have suspended (in our sense) note
redemption. Figure 11 shows that as kF increases, discounts on foreign notes in the home
market increase and discounts on home notes in the foreign market fall. Increasing kF is
similar to decreasing θF because both make the option of going to a banker less valuable
to the holder of a note. Thus, one can follow the reasoning for the case of changes in θH
to get the intuition for why changing kF aﬀects discounts as it does. These predictions are
consistent with the data shown in Figures 3 and 4 since, except for a short period from May
through August 1837, New York banks were redeeming their notes while Wilmington and
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Figure 11: Eﬀects of increasing kF on discounts on home and foreign notes
Philadelphia banks were suspended.
Because virtually all banks in the United States were suspended from May through
August 1837, and banks in Philadelphia and most of the southern and western part of the
country were suspended from October 1839 through March 1842, we also examine the case in
which all banks are suspended. Specifically, we examine the case in which kH = kF = k > 0;
that is, all banks have suspended by the same percentage. Figure 12 shows that both dH and
dF decline with k. The intuition for this result is that as k increases, the amount of goods
that local nonbankers can get from a local banker decreases. This reduces the wedge between
the values of local and nonlocal notes to a local nonbanker. The discount on nonlocal notes
declines as a result.
This prediction of the model is consistent with the data on the discounts on New
York banknotes quoted in Philadelphia from May through August 1837, when banks in both
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Figure 12: Eﬀects of increasing k on dH and dF
New York and Philadelphia were suspended. However, it is inconsistent with the behavior
of discounts quoted in both New York and Philadelphia on the notes of banks in all other
locations when both that bank and New York or Philadelphia banks were also suspended.
However, if we allow for asymmetric suspensions by New York and Philadelphia banks with
respect to banks in other locations, then the predictions of the model would be consistent
with the data if kH − kF were large enough.
Our model also predicts that the value of banknotes declines when bankers suspend
payment. This is shown in Figure 13 where we plot the quantity of goods that are exchanged
for a home note (xH) when home bankers are suspended and when they are redeeming at par.
Note that the diﬀerence increases with θH because as θH increases, the redemption option
is a large fraction of the value of a banknote, and suspension reduces this option value. If
we interpret the value of xH when banks are redeeming at par as the value of specie, then
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Figure 13: Quantity of goods exchanged for home note (xH) when home bankers suspended
or redeeming at par
this result can be interpreted as saying that banknotes go at a discount to specie when banks
suspend. Such discounts are observed in the data and are the final fact we want to match.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a model to qualitatively match some facts about
the discounts on the notes–dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on
demand–issued by state banks in the United States prior to 1863. The model we construct
builds on the basic search model of money by Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). To
attempt to account for locational diﬀerences in banknote discounts, our model has nonbankers
that come from two distinct locations. Each location also has bankers that can issue notes.
We model the fact that banknotes had to be redeemed in specie on demand by adapting the
Cavalcanti-Wallace (1999) innovation that banks are required to produce when a banknote is
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presented for redemption and their past actions are public information. This implies that a
nonbanker will be willing to accept a banknote when trading with a banker. Banknotes are
also valued because they overcome the absence of double coincidence meetings in matches
between two nonbankers.
We present two versions of the model. In the first, banks are threatened with perma-
nent autarky if they ever fail to produce the same quantity of goods when their notes are
presented for payment as they obtain when issuing a note. We refer to this case as par re-
demption. In the second, banks are allowed to suspend payments on their notes by redeeming
them at an exogenously determined amount below their issue value.
The specific goal of the paper was to qualitatively match five facts about the discounts
on banknotes. One fact is that notes of local banks were always quoted at par. Our model is
consistent with this fact, but trivially because we allow bankers and nonbankers with notes to
make TIOLI oﬀers. A second fact is that foreign banknotes usually were quoted at a discount
to local banknotes, and this discount varied by the location of the bank and by where the
discount was being quoted. Our model is consistent with this fact. It is also consistent with
a third fact: discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted
in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally diﬀered from the discounts quoted
in location B on the notes of banks in location A.
The last two facts involve banknote discounts when banks had suspended payment
on their notes. One fact is that local banknotes were quoted at a discount to specie when
local banks suspended. Even though specie does not explicitly appear in our model, it can be
interpreted as being consistent with this fact if we interpret the value of specie in our model
to be the value of banknotes when banks are redeeming. The second fact about the behavior
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of discounts when banks were suspended is that the discounts on foreign notes increased.
Here the model is consistent with the data only under the assumption that local bankers
have suspended to a much lesser degree than have nonlocal bankers. Otherwise, the model
predicts that discounts will fall, not increase.
Thus, we think the overall performance of the model is quite good. It delivers predic-
tions consistent with four of the facts we wanted to explain and consistent with the fifth fact
in some special cases. Of course, we have only examined how well the model fits with the
data in a qualitative sense. The next step is to see how the model’s predictions match the
actual quantitative discounts.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. A stationary distribution of banknote holdings must satisfy the following equations:
mH0[θH + (1− θH)πPF (mFHΛHFH +mFFΛFFH)] = mHH [ΓHθH +
+(1− θH)πPFmF0ΛHHF ] + (1− θH)mHFπPFmF0ΛFHF(A-1)
mHH [ΓHθH + (1− θH)πPFmF0ΛHHF ]
= mH0[θH + (1− θH)πPFmFHΛHFH ](A-2)
mHFmF0ΛFHF = mH0mFFΛ
F
FH(A-3)
mF0[θF + (1− θF )πPH(mHFΛFHF +mHHΛHHF )] = mFF [ΓFθF +
+(1− θF )πPHmH0ΛFFH ] + (1− θF )mFHπPHmH0ΛHFH(A-4)
mFF [ΓFθF + (1− θF )πPHmH0ΛFFH ]
= mF0[θF + (1− θF )πPHmHFΛFHF ](A-5)
mFHmH0ΛHFH = mF0mHHΛ
H
HF(A-6)
mH0 +mHF +mHH = 1(A-7)
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mF0 +mFF +mFH = 1(A-8)
Equations (A-1) and (A-4) are redundant. Substituting (A-3) into (A-2) and (A-6) into (A-5),
we obtain
mH0 = mHH
mF0 = mFF
A2. Proof of Theorem 1
The strategy is to guess that ΛHHF = Λ
F
FH = Λ
H
FH = Λ
F
HF = 1 are equilibrium strategies
and then to verify under what conditions all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Note
that this guess implies that under a par redemption equilibrium, ΓH = ΓF = 1.
Lemma 3. If ΛHHF = Λ
F
FH = Λ
H
FH = Λ
F
HF = 1, then stationary note holdings are equal to
1
3
.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we have
mF0 = mFF(A-9)
mH0 = mHH(A-10)
Combining (A-9) with (A-3) yields
mHF = mH0 = mHH(A-11)
Combining (A-10) with (A-6) yields
mFH = mF0 = mFF(A-12)
Now combining (A-11) and (A-12) with (A-7) and (A-8), it follows that mij = 13 ,∀i, j ∈
{0, H, F}.
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We will focus only on the home market; for the foreign market the same arguments
apply.
Lemma 4. The quantities xH and zH are part of a monetary SSE and ΛHHF = Λ
F
FH = Λ
H
FH =
ΛFHF = 1 if they solve the following two equations and four incentive constraints.
ρxH = πθH [u(xH)− xH ] + (1− θH)
π2
3
{PH [u (xH)− xH ] + PF [u (zH)− xH ]}(A-13)
ρzH = (1− θF )
π2
3
{PH [u (xH)− zH ] + PF [u (zH)− zH ]}(A-14)
u(zH) ≥ xH(A-15)
u(xH) ≥ zH(A-16)
u(zH) ≥ zH(A-17)
u(xH) ≥ xH(A-18)
To show existence of equilibrium, we proceed in two steps. First we establish that a solution
to (A-13) and (A-14) exists and is unique. Then we show that for small values of θH and θF ,
such a solution is incentive compatible.
Lemma 5. Suppose u(·) is homogeneous of degree n, with n ∈ (0, 1), n = mk , where m and
k are natural numbers. For any value of θH and θF in [0, 1), there exists a unique solution
(xH , zH) to equations (A-13) and (A-14).
Proof. Rewrite (A-13) as½
ρ+ πθH + (1− θH)
π2
3
δ
¾
xH =
½
πθH +
π2
3
(1− θH)PH
¾
u(xH)+
π2
3
(1−θH)PFu (zH)(A-19)
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and (A-14) as½
ρ+
π2
3
δ(1− θF )
¾
zH =
π2
3
(1− θF )PHu(xH) +
π2
3
(1− θF )PFu(zH).(A-20)
The above system can be written as
Ax = Bu(x) + Cu(z)(A-21)
Dz = Eu(x) + Fu(z)(A-22)
with all six coeﬃcients positive. Solving for (x, z) is equivalent to solving for (x, α) with
α ∈ R, defined as z = αx. We are looking for a pair (x, z) strictly positive, so we exclude the
case α = 0. Substituting, we then have
Ax = Bu(x) + Cαnu(x)(A-23)
Dαx = Eu(x) + Fαnu(x),(A-24)
that is,
x =
B + Cαn
A
u(x)(A-25)
x =
E + Fαn
Dα
u(x).(A-26)
Given x 6= 0, the system becomes
x = Γu(x)(A-27)
B + Cαn
A
=
E + Fαn
Dα
= Γ.(A-28)
We know that (A-27) has a solution for any Γ > 0. We look at equation (A-28) and rewrite
it as
CDαn+1 +BDα−AFαn −AE = 0.(A-29)
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Since this is a continuous function of α, p(α), note that p(0) = −AE < 0 (so that α = 0 is
not a solution). Also, since CD > 0, limα→∞ p(α) = ∞. So a positive solution must exist.
Moreover, since n is a rational number, we can change variables, setting αˆ = α
1
k , and (A-29)
becomes
CDαˆm+k +BDαˆk −AFαˆm −AE = 0.(A-30)
The above is now a polynomial of degree m+ k with the same zeros as (A-29). Also (A-30)
has only one sign change, so by Descartes’ sign rule, there can be only one positive solution.
Denoting the solution of (A-13) and (A-14) by (xˆ(θ), zˆ(θ)) with θ = (θH , θF ), we now
need to show for what parameter values such a solution is incentive compatible.
Lemma 6. If θH = θF = 0, a monetary SSE exists and xˆ(0) = zˆ(0) = x˜, whereµ
ρ+
π2δ
3
¶
x˜ =
π2δ
3
u(x˜).(A-31)
Proof. When θH = θF = 0, the right-hand sides of (A-19) and (A-20) are equal. Given that
PH + PF = δ, then xˆ = zˆ = x˜. The existence of x˜ > 0 can easily be proved by noting that
the left-hand side and right-hand side of (A-31) are continuous, are equal at zero, and that u
satisfies the Inada conditions. This is a standard argument in Trejos-Wright (1995) models.
Definition: Given the utility function u(·), define u˜ ∈ R as the unique value such that
u(u˜) = u˜.
Note that by (A-31), since
³
ρ+ π
2δ
3
´
/π
2δ
3
> 1, x˜ < u˜. Define ω˜ = u(x˜)− x˜ > 0. The
strategy to show that (xˆ(θ), zˆ(θ)) are incentive compatible is as follows. We show that for
small values of θ, xˆ and zˆ are arbitrarily close to each other and arbitrarily close to x˜, so that
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both are less than u˜. Finally, we show that arbitrarily close xˆ and zˆ, together with being less
than u˜, implies that the incentive constraints are satisfied.
The coeﬃcients A,B,C,D,E, F are continuous in θ. The solution for α is the unique
positive zero of (A-30), and since the zero of a polynomial changes continuously with its
coeﬃcients,4 we conclude that αˆ changes continuously with θ. The solution xˆ to (A-27) is
given by
xˆ = (u(1)Γ)
1
1−n ,(A-32)
which depends continuously on Γ, so xˆ depends continuously on θ. There exists a unique
solution for every θ ∈ [0, 1)× [0, 1). We have that as θ→ 0, (A-30) converges to
αˆm+k + αˆk − αˆm − 1 = 0,(A-33)
so that αˆ = 1 at θ = 0, and for θ = 0, xˆ = x˜. We then conclude that (xˆ, αˆ) → (x˜, 1) as
θ → 0, or in other words, (xˆ, zˆ)→ (x˜, x˜).
Define the distance in R2 between θ and 0 as d(θ, 0) = k(θH , θF )− (0, 0)k.
Lemma 7. Let xˆ and zˆ be a solution to (A-13) and (A-14). Then for small d(θ, 0), xˆ and zˆ
satisfy the incentive constraints (A-15) to (A-18).
Proof. Given x˜ < u˜, and given (xˆ, zˆ)→ (x˜, x˜) for small values of d, we have that xˆ < u˜ and
z˜ < u˜ so that (A-17) and (A-18) hold. As before, let zˆ = αˆxˆ so that we rewrite (A-15) and
(A-16) as
u(xˆ) ≥ 1
αˆn
xˆ, u(xˆ) ≥ αˆxˆ.(A-34)
4A statement of this theorem can be found in Beauzamy (1999).
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But given (xˆ, αˆ)→ (x˜, 1) as d→ 0, the result follows for small enough d, given x˜ < u˜.
Combining the previous lemmas, we prove the theorem.
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